

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

85- 3724/X /2

ER

3 October 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: NIO/Africa

FROM: DCI

SUBJECT: South African Situation

Attached for your information is a report prepared by Ambassador Robert B. Keating.

C

William J. Casey

Attachment:

Letter dated 27 September 1985
w/attached memo to VADM Poindexter
and Phillip H. Ringdahl

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Remarks

Executive Secretary

30 Sept 85

Date

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27 September 1985

The Honorable William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Bill:

Enclosed is a copy of my report. John Helgerson, [redacted]
and [redacted] were of immense help to me.

I'm leaving tomorrow for Madagascar and may well be back in three months' time. [redacted]
[redacted]

Very best personal wishes,


Robert B. Keating

Enclosure
"The South African Situation"
(SECRET [redacted])

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26 September 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Vice Admiral John M. Poindexter, USN
Phillip H. Ringdahl

3724/1

SUBJECT: The South African Situation

My impressions of the South African situation may be summed up as follows:

- 1) The problems of South Africa will persist for a long time, they will get worse over the next 12 months, and US domestic concerns over apartheid will continue to mount (the situation will be exacerbated by the enormous hype and pressures of the media).
- 2) Over the past 2 1/2 years, the formulation and implementation of US policy for South Africa has been almost exclusively the domain of just two principal State Department officials. For many senior people in the bureaucracy and on the Hill, there is now the strong feeling that we are mired down, that we do not know where we are going, or where we are being led in terms of urgent decisions which must be taken. To counteract this impression, there is an immediate need to enlarge the number of players in a structured way for detailed examination of how we should spend our limited political and economic influence in South Africa over the next three months, six months, year (e.g., inasmuch as the time frame is critical in looking at South African developments, is our time line the remaining 2 1/2 years of the Reagan Administration, a longer term, or a combination of both?).
- 3) The Administration has become defensive about the label of "Constructive Engagement" and we should minimize discussions or attempts to defend Constructive Engagement per se in public fora (i.e., the acute need for a defensible policy for our ambassadors and others in their public appearances throughout the United States).
- 4) The positive reaction on the Hill to the President having imposed certain sanctions on South Africa indicated that we need not shy away from positive steps if they serve a good and larger purpose (i.e., a little activism has given us more time to prepare a better strategy for dealing with South African problems and issues).
- 5) With respect to the South African "credit crunch", the Administration should place itself in a position to take credit for what's going to happen anyway. The bankers are not going to write off South Africa. They will wait for the government's decision on its payments moratorium, and then there will be a roll-over (in the meantime, the bankers will feign agony). We should exploit the inevitable by making it look as if we were responsible for the outcome.
- 6) We must make every effort to establish more active links with South African and American business leaders who are actively working for reform and change in South Africa. In this respect, we must ensure that prominent American businessmen are members of the proposed South African Advisory Committee.

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
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My recommendations for achieving better policy determinations for South Africa are:

- 1) Establish a working-level team of analysts to examine the likely relationship among foreseeable future developments in South Africa utilizing Cross-Impact Analysis. Such analysis will allow us to a) understand more systematically the likely linkages among possible future events, and, possibly, b) the enhancement or diminishment of US influence related to important events and scenarios. A minimum of three half days over four weeks and five to seven experts (State, NSC, DIA and CIA) would be required for this work.
- 2) A committee of senior policymakers (SIG level) should be established promptly for systematic discussion of unfolding events in South Africa and their implications for US policy determinations. This group should review all optimal US policy options (from "do nothing" to "all-out pressures").

Attached are the following working papers:

- Tab A Cross-Impact Analysis: A Methodology for Assessing Future Events
- Tab B Implications of Cross-Impact Analysis for U.S. Goals in South Africa
- Tab C Representative Areas for U.S. Leverage with South Africa
- Tab D An Econometric Model for South Africa
- Tab E South African Analysis (Preliminary)
- Tab F Overview of American-African Policy


Robert B. Keating

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Cross-Impact Analysis: A Methodology for Assessing Future Events

Cross-impact analysis is a way of utilizing the subjective judgment of experts to examine the linkages between possible future events and to examine "what if" kinds of questions. Two components are central to the process: (a) subjective expert judgment to estimate the relationship or impact between each of the related events in a problem; and (b) a systematic way of recording those judgments.

Although policymakers are most often interested in the bottom line, the outcome of the analysis, previous uses of this methodology indicate that much of the value comes from the discussion between analysts who are called upon to defend their judgments. The methodology makes assumptions explicit and records the chain of logic for all to see.

Requirements

A cross-impact analysis of possible future events in South Africa would require the cooperation of experts from State, the NSC, DIA, and CIA. A minimum of three half-days over a period of several weeks would be required to: (a) generate a consensus list of important events; (b) complete the cross-impact matrix; and (c) discuss the scenario analyses. If the group of 5-7 persons proposed a large number of events or scenarios (or if there were substantial disagreement among the analysts), more time would be required.

Benefits

In addition to the gains from a systematic discussion of a complex problem, cross-impact analysis can identify events whose occurrence or non-occurrence would have especially far-reaching impact on other possible developments in a designated period. It can also highlight events that on face appear important but which have little impact on other outcomes, particularly if combined with the occurrence of some other event. In a fluid and difficult-to-predict situation such as that in South Africa, sensitivity analysis and scenario testing are major benefits of the methodology.

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Ambassador Robert B. Keating
19 September 1985

Implications of Cross-Impact Analysis
for U.S. Goals in South Africa

Statement of Goals:

The fundamental, overall objective of U.S. policy toward South Africa is the provision of equal economic, political, and judicial rights to citizens of all races. Only in such circumstances can the U.S. Government protect specific U.S. interests: preserving access to strategic minerals; maintaining the security of the Cape sea routes; preventing growth of Marxist-Leninist influence in South Africa and the region; and accommodating the American public's demand that the U.S. support equality for all in South Africa.

Analytic Approach

Cross-Impact analysis allows us to understand more systematically the likely linkages among possible future events. The illustrative "findings" below result from a preliminary application of this technique to the South African situation, working with the attached list of key developments.

Findings

Overall, our finding is that improvement in the political position of non-whites in South Africa is integrally related to improvement of their economic lot. Improvement in their economic condition is dependent on a reduction in racial strife and, to a lesser extent, to a less-hostile regional environment. If U.S. goals are to be achieved in South Africa, the treason trial of Reverend Boesak must be avoided. Solutions to the ongoing credit crunch and support for private sector initiatives are required. The salient considerations are:

a. Racial Turmoil

Reduction in racial tension in South Africa is a necessary condition for the achievement of U.S. goals. Higher levels of racial conflict, as might be sparked by the trial of Reverend Boesak for treason, increase the likelihood of a general strike and the imposition of martial law. These conditions severely reduce the ability of the private sector to improve the economic condition of workers and increase the likelihood of capital outflow and disinvestment. Conversely, such steps as satisfactory resolution of South Africa's short-term credit crisis and revocation of the Pass Laws reduce racial tension and provide an environment conducive to economic progress for South Africa.

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b. Economic Progress

Private sector initiatives, coupled with a reversal of capital outflow by maintaining South Africa's credit rating, increases the economic well-being of all South Africans. They further reduce regional tensions and make the signing of a regional security accord more likely. The resulting decline in "siege mentality" would make political gains, such as the revocation of Pass Laws and the release of Mandela (45%), more likely.

c. Political Progress

Increased political equality is tied closely to reductions in racial tension and an improved South African economy. Regional security accords, however, would also have salutary effects on race relations, the economy, and political equality.

Urgent Courses of Action

- Stop provocative acts such as treason trial.
- Help with current credit crunch.
(For example, the U.S. Government could buy strategic materials in exchange for policy reforms, the notion of U.S. banks accepting private equity in lieu of debt obligations, etc.)
- Expand private sector reform initiatives.
- Promote regional security accords.

Goal Definition

- Access to strategic minerals (straight line)
- Cape sea route security (straight line)
- Marxism/Communism in region (straight line)
- Marxism/Communism in South Africa (increasing concern)
- Domestic U.S. concerns over South Africa (dramatically increased)

(The new and critical concerns are South African domestic developments and U.S. domestic concerns over South Africa.)

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Policy Options (from "do nothing" to "all-out pressures")

- 1) Abandon Constructive Engagement and do less (benign neglect)
- 2) Proceed with Constructive Engagement as is
- 3) Remove label of Constructive Engagement, but keep doing what we are now doing (avoid heartache of label)
- 4) Remove label of Constructive Engagement, but proceed with more active and specific economic and political measures (carrot and stick approach)
- 5) Unleash all-out pressures (Carter/Mondale approach)

Note: A quick look at our limited political and economic leverage reveals that we do not have enough levers for Option #5, but sufficient for #3 and #4. Options 3 and 4 would provide a realistic approach to our concerns over growing radicalism in South Africa and growing U.S. domestic concerns over South Africa.

Possible Scenarios

- 1) Continuing violence which gets worse (regional front on ice, no effective security, defiance of government, turbulence domestically and regionally)
- 2) More of the same, messy, uneven, continuing violence, but without sharp deterioration of political and economic situation
- 3) Clear, concrete, visible reform - greater stability and less violence

Discussion

The analysis showed clearly that little progress can be made toward meeting any of the U.S. objectives in South Africa under conditions of high racial conflict. The first order of business for U.S. policy is to convince the South African leaders to refrain from future provocative acts, such as the possible banning of the United Democratic Front (UDF) or the trial of Reverend Boesak for treason.

Matters of racial status are very important to the Afrikaner leadership and they will not be easily led to new policies. Yet, important credit agreements with Swiss and German bankers were cancelled as a result of Reverend Boesak's arrest. The impact of domestic events in South Africa on the international business and financial community--so apparent in the Cross-Impact model--must be spelled out for the Botha government.

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A successful resolution of South Africa's ongoing credit crisis is a vital step toward establishing a stable economic environment conducive to political reform. South Africa's total foreign debt currently stands at \$24 billion; \$14 billion of this total is due within the next 12 months.

Unless an agreement favorable to South Africa is reached, the repayment "standstill" will continue past December and additional foreign credit for trade and investment will be unavailable. In addition, foreign firms operating in South Africa are likely to view the lack of an agreement as a signal of continued instability leading them to reduce or discontinue operations in South Africa.

U.S. goals are more readily achieved in an improved economic environment. Senior South African business leaders, including the CEOs of major U.S. corporations with subsidiary operations in South Africa, see an urgent need for improved economic opportunities for workers of all races and abolishment of the apartheid system. They are actively working to remove barriers to free movement, property and business rights, and an end to the enforced separation of families of migrant laborers. These proposed reforms are not only good for the economy but help provide fundamental rights and justice for all South African workers.

Under these circumstances, U.S. policy should support the work of the newly formed U.S. Corporate Council on South Africa, continue to support the Sullivan Principles, and resist pressures for disinvestment.

In the past, South African leadership has broken out of its siege mentality and successfully negotiated with ideologically hostile neighbors (Nkomati Accords). Negotiation of a broader regional security agreement could remove South Africa's most immediate external threat, the military faction of the African National Congress. Cross-Impact analysis shows that if regional security agreements were reached, political rights are more likely to be accorded to blacks, private sector efforts to improve the economic status of blacks are more likely to succeed, and Angola is more likely to get rid of its Cuban burden. In sum, a regional security agreement would impact positively on a number of factors which operate for the fundamental objectives of U.S. policy in South Africa.

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Ambassador Robert B. Keating
18 September 1985

Illustrative

Assumptions

1. Goals that are shared by South Africa and the United States will be easier to achieve than those that are not shared.
2. Both South Africa and the United States would like racial conflict in South Africa to end.
3. During periods of visible racial conflict, the South African government is unable to institute reforms. Any concessions will be perceived by blacks to be "too little, too late." Moreover, the Calvinist leaders of South Africa are unable to compromise when pressured to do so. Racial reform is much more likely to occur during periods of racial peace.
4. South Africa cannot be coerced into racial reform by outside influences, not only because of the reasons stated above, but also because it is very self-sufficient and controls raw materials required in the West.
5. South Africa values its international credit rating.
6. South Africa would like a stable, non-threatening set of neighbors; the U.S. would like to reduce Communist influence in the area.
7. Disinvestment by American business would be costly to shareholders and counterproductive for South African blacks.

Our major concerns, or goals, in South Africa are:

- 1) To improve economic opportunities for blacks
- 2) To provide a basic quantity of rights to all parties
(blacks, yellows, whites)

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Illustrative

Sample List of Factors During the Next 12 Months

1. Boesak tried for treason.
2. Marital Law declared; SADF mobilized.
3. Mandela released under his own terms.
4. Mandela transferred to hospital in foreign country.
5. Pass Laws abolished.
6. General Strike called.
7. Credit crisis averted (capital flow reversed).
8. Private Sector initiatives provide greater black political and economic rights.
9. Regional Security Accords negotiated (ANC homeless).
10. Angola sends Cubans packing.

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Prior
Probability

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	.7	.4	.05	.25	.5	.5	.6	.7	.1	.2
1		.8	.01	.25	.2	.8	.1	.3	.01	.05
2	.9		.01	.5	.01	.9	.05	.2	.01	.05
3	.1	.01		.25	.9	.2	.9	.7	.4	.3
4	.7	.3	—		.6	.4	.7	.8	.15	.25
5	.5	.2	.15	.25		.3	.7	.85	.2	.25
6	.85	.95	.01	.25	.2		.25	.2	.05	.05
7	.7	.4	.05	.25	.7	.3		.9	.1	.2
8	.6	.2	.15	.25	.75	.2	.9		.4	.3
9	.5	.25	.45	.25	.8	.4	.8	.85		.4
10	.4	.3	.35	.25	.6	.5	.8	.8	.8	

(If event 1 occurs, how does that affect or change the probabilities of each of the other related events?)

Comments:

What we look for are dramatic changes in events compared to top line, and where they occur.

--What operates against our principal concerns or goals

--What operates for our principal concerns or goals

--What initiatives could be taken to modify or change event outcomes to achieve principal goals

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Representative Areas for US Leverage with South Africa
(The pros and cons of each possibility would be discussed)

US leverage with South Africa is limited, but there are a few general areas where some influence might be exerted. We see three primary areas where the US might calibrate its policy actions in pursuit of such opportunities:

Security

- Intensify or relax US efforts to help arrange and sustain regional security agreements between South Africa and its neighbors.
- Intensify international effort to embargo South African weapons purchases, as by pressing Israelis to limit their arms relationship with South Africa.
- Halt all transfer of US nuclear technology to South Africa.

Economic

- Press US and European banks not to roll over or reschedule South African debt (or take the opposite tack).
- Take actions necessary to force the South Africans to create politically unpopular high current account surpluses or use gold reserves to pay short term debt.
- Encourage Europeans to join US in economic moves affecting South African mineral sales, debt financing, etc. (Establish more active links with American and South African businessmen.)

Political

- Limit diplomatic contacts and lower overall profile with South Africa.
- Increase contacts with more militant organizations in southern Africa, to include higher level talks with the ANC.
- Change US public posture toward South Africa by shifting Administration position in current dialogue within US.
- Be more supportive of anti-South African positions in international arena.

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
An Econometric Model for South Africa

An econometric model of a national economy, such as South Africa, can serve two purposes. First, the model can be used to forecast the future course of the economy. Once the values of factors determined outside of the model are estimated, (e.g. U.S. interest rates, London gold price) the model will generate values for all of the remaining economic variables as far into the future as you wish. This process, however, is fraught with hazard because the forecasts depend upon the values assigned to the outside economic factors. Also, the mathematical equations that specify the many economic relationships within the model are estimated using historical data. If the structure of the economy changes so that past relationships no longer apply perfectly, the model will generate incorrect solutions for the future values.

The second important use of an econometric model is to evaluate the response of the economy to unusual events. Assuming that the structure of the economy is unchanged it is possible to change the value of one important economic factor and then determine how that change affects the other economic variables in the economy. In the case of South Africa it is possible to estimate the affects of an export boycott, a massive outflow of foreign capital, or a large change in the price of gold. Using the model in this way is much less hazardous because you do not need to specify the actual value of factors only the degree of change.

South Africa: Foreign Debt by Length of Maturity

Billions of U.S. Dollars



*U.S. Banks hold \$3.5 of the \$14.0 billion due in 12 months or less

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Ambassador Robert B. Keating
16 September 1985

South African Analysis
(Preliminary)

Over the years, we have analyzed the South African political corpus down to barest bones and finest muscular filaments. Still it reacts in ways which surprise us and outdistance our policies. An additional exercise like this one is useful only if it provides an analytical framework for multi-dimensioned analysis of the body politic as a whole and illuminates, in the process, previously ignored vital parts of the problem.

Principal Concern

- Providing a basic quantity of rights to all parties in South Africa (blacks, yellows, whites)
- Not a question of who is or who is not in power
 - The apartheid mold is being broken, but we don't want another Lebanon

The Critical Question

Are we pushing South Africa into a situation where there could be a significant shift in power between blacks and whites which might lead to a debacle with one group ending up with all the power?

A Critical Observation

South Africa is a regional superpower with physical power but not diplomatic capital (political capital lost over past 12 months).

What's gone wrong?

- A series of unpredicted events (e.g., Cabinda, Botswana, Angola raids)
- Efforts of South Africa to possess mind of Jonas Savimbi
- Current cycle of violence in South Africa which increasingly diverts government attention from regional issues

Comment: Constructive engagement made progress its first two years but did not keep pace with what is happening on the ground.

U.S. Goals

- Encourage peaceful change with greater economic opportunities for blacks
- Provide a basic quantity of rights to blacks, yellows and whites
- Work for regional accommodation
- Keep hostile outside forces from taking advantage of situation
(Forestall Soviet attempts to discredit South Africa's government and gain adherents in townships)
- Keep U.S. national debate on South Africa from becoming oversimplified and partisan

Key Considerations

- Helping the blacks
- Not harming South Africa's economy
(South Africa's neighbors depend on South Africa's economy)
- Helping neighboring black countries

Comment: The South African issue is one of the remarkable events of 1985 (although 6,000 miles away, South Africa has become a central and emotional issue in the American political system)

What is needed

Rational positions on South African problems and issues which are in line with U.S. national interests in the region and which can be supported by the broad majority of Americans (Is this possible? will most Americans ever understand the complex forces at work in South Africa?)

How important is South Africa to the West?

- Strongest and most diversified economy in sub-Saharan Africa
- South Africa has strategic minerals and Cape sea routes important to the West
- If South Africa collapses, will the southern third of Africa go with it? (Is this plausible?)

How much influence do we have?

- Our economic and political influence in South Africa is limited
- Whatever is happening in South Africa and the region will occur inexorably

Comment: U.S. firms form less than 1% of the South African GNP. U.S. investment is less than a fifth of overseas investment in South Africa (in recent years, about 90% of new investment in South Africa was generated inside the country)

If U.S. firms leave South Africa, for whatever reason, there are a lot of willing buyers ready to pick up the shares at knockdown prices (and they wouldn't care much about the Sullivan principles or codes of conduct vis a vis black workers)

Critical Questions

- If things really go off the rails in South Africa, is there an alternative scenario?
- What are the prospects of keeping discussions going over next two/three years?
- Since our influence is inherently diplomatic (not based on AID programs or a major line of credit, etc.), are we not weakening our ability to discuss issues, options, and consequences by imposing sanctions?
- How should we spend our limited influence over the next 12 months (in what areas)? What are the trade-offs among different instruments of influence?
- How far should we go in holding South Africa's "feet to the fire"? What will other Western countries do? Will the U.S. maintain its present level of interest (durability question)?
- What are the ultimate trade-offs if our present policy turns sour and we lose whatever degree of influence we now possess with South Africa? Are we not talking about "damage limitation" over the next two to three years?

Possible Scenarios

1. Continuing violence which gets worse (regional front on ice, no effective security, defiance of government, turbulence domestically and regionally)
2. More of the same, messy, uneven, continued violence, but without sharp deterioration
3. Clear, concrete, visible reform - greater stability and less violence.

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Ambassador Robert B. Keating
16 September 1985

Overview of American-African Policy

In formulating American policy towards the African continent, I would ask the following questions:

Is the African Bureau Chiefs of Mission Conference a time for serious reflection or is it a ritualistic convocation of Ambassadors for institutional reasons (or an occasion for ritual affirmation of policy goals)?

- What are the essential policy themes which affect and underlie contemporary African debate (or contradictory themes)?
- What are the significant continuities and major changes needed, if any, in the conduct of our African policy (the over-arching continuities in underlying principles)?
- Is there need for more overall logic to the formulation of policy? Are there alternative conceptual frameworks? Are we developing an adequate data base for identifying the elements of continuity and change?

May not the array of U.S. principles, assumptions and interests which shape American-African policies over time be displayed in matrix form?

- The nature of the domestic policy arena
- The policy apparatus itself
- The domestic constituencies concerned with African issues
- The claims and constraints of our policies originating in Africa (both short-term and long-term)
- The perceptions of Soviet-African relationships and the overall climate of Soviet-American relations.

Comments:

We have pledged American aid to African development needs, for which market economy principles and a propitious investment climate are proposed as fundamental remedies.

Undergirding the entire structure of policy reason is a permanent counter-Soviet preoccupation (to foreclose Soviet opportunities). (What is the best strategy for low-cost preemption of Soviet action?)

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Is not French financial and technical assistance (and that of the EEC) a crucial supplement to the severe limitations on American aid resources for Africa?

What is the thinking that goes beyond present principles and postulates-- e.g., the brokering of periodic crises in such a way as to foster stable and moderate regimes, and to preempt or at least circumscribe Soviet advantage? (Is the process by which these crises are removed from the world agenda, in internationally legitimate fashion, viewed as the maximum feasible accomplishment?)

Does not the general preference for stability and support of moderate regimes lead to the postulate that the preservation of relationships of influence by the former colonizers is a positive asset for us?

The continuous tug and pull of the East-West competition tends to produce a bimodal distribution of African states between "radical" and "moderate", "East-leaning" and "West-leaning" versions of non-alignment.

What are the major long-term trends?

- The economic impasse facing most non-oil-producing African states (the impasse is profound, deeply rooted, widespread and long-term).
- The limitations of external resources (sums in prospect are dwarfed by the magnitude of the needs).
 - American aid (approximately \$1 billion for sub-Saharan Africa) has yielded only modest accomplishments. The federal budgetary situation and the weak political support for aid, make unlikely any substantial increase in overall funds available. What aid resources are available tend strongly to be distributed in response to political priorities within Africa (our capacity for self-deception on this remains impressive). Further, the developmental effectiveness of aid has been hampered by institutional factors. The very fragility of its political support has led to repeated cosmetic manipulations (the "New Directions" mandate of 1973, the "Four Pillars of Development" of McPherson).
 - American aid available to Africa has been squeezed by the higher priority of other crisis areas (e.g., Israel, although labeled a developed state beyond the need of aid, received \$2.6 billion in 1983, or more than as much overall of sub-Saharan Africa. Egypt also more than doubled the sub-Saharan total. Even Syria, widely stigmatized as a Soviet client state, received \$86 million in 1982, or more than any other African state except Egypt, Sudan, Somalia and Kenya.)

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- The steady rise in the saliency of southern African issues (which absorb the greater part of the energies of the African Bureau).
- The gradual increase in the number and intensity of inter-African conflicts (Western Sahara, Chad, the Horn, southern Africa) with conditions of permanent civil war now existing in Chad, Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique and Morocco, and the spectre of race warfare in South Africa.
- The slow rise in the importance of Islamic ideology in African domestic policies and international affairs (fueled by the sums of money available for Islam-textured politics - a new synthesis of Africanicity, religion and anti-imperialism).

What do we find on the Soviet side?

- The deepening awareness of the fragility of Socialist experiments seems to have reinforced the trend towards a focus upon military and security assistance. By buttressing the internal security of African states of Socialist orientation, and by institutionalizing their ideological options through the construction of a Leninist political apparatus, the Soviet Union hopes to make such regimes less susceptible to coups or sudden shifts of alignment by incumbent rulers.
- The increasingly severe economic constraints placed upon Soviet policy by the dramatic slowdown in economic growth (which rules out any open-ended commitment to economic support of an African supplicant state and has led to the tough-minded pursuit of mercantile advantage in some spheres - witness the friction-creating fishing accords with coastal states).
- The growing focus upon Mozambique, Ethiopia and Angola as client states (the "left wing" of National Democratic states, or states of "confirmed Socialist orientation").
- The accelerating decay of detente from the late 1970's on.
- A last vector lies in the occasional great realigning event which permanently alters the parameters of the African diplomatic arena (e.g., the Portuguese coup and the eclipse of the imperial regime in Ethiopia).

In summing up, would not a concerted effort to address the following questions force an examination of African issues in the broadest possible context and thus assist in the formulation of better U.S. policy for Africa?

- ° What are the lessons of our diplomatic encounters with Africa thus far?

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- Is American policy towards Africa an endless reproduction in successive contextual settings of patterns established since independence was obtained 40 years ago?
- Has there been a consequential evolution and change in African political patterns over this period (or only marginal movements along the spectrum and not of underlying substance)?
- Given the generally low priority of African affairs, will not much of our policy continue to revolve around crisis management?
- Do we not have a set of standing assumptions, explicit and implicit, concerning Africa which make unlikely any radical mutations in overall policy thrust?
- Do strategic interests in Africa (such as shipping lanes and raw materials) play a significant or a modest part in our geopolitical thought (the "globalists" vs. the "regionalists")?

(E.g., outside of South Africa, oil represents the most important investment stake and trade is an interest of modest valence since it is under 10% of total U.S. foreign trade.)
- Although the African political environment is inherently instable, do not the African states have a common set of principles, however diverse these countries may be one to the other?
 - Liberating the continent from foreign or white minority rule
 - The doctrine of non-alignment
 - Looking at global divisions in north-south terms
 - The desire to insulate the continent from the east-west struggle (participation in broader Third World efforts such as NIEO)
 - African dignity and social justice vs. neo-colonialism.
- Are not Soviet policy principles and premises in Africa a mirror image of American ones?
- Is not Soviet action in Africa informed by a commitment to global presence as a world power and participation in the resolution of all major international issues?
- With only meager Soviet aid devoted to fostering non-capitalist development, is not Soviet strategic interest in Africa mainly determined by the need for support base facilities for Indian Ocean and Atlantic fleet operations, airport access for anti-submarine surveillance, and overflight rights to permit rapid protection of Soviet power when required?

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- Has not "constructive engagement" failed to dent either the Namibia impasse or apartheid? Have not the actual changes, if any, been far less than what appeared in the original blueprint? Was not "constructive engagement" to have encompassed an active American regional presence with an expanded aid program, a simultaneous Namibian resolution, and Soviet preemption through linkage of South African withdrawal and removal of Cuban troops in Angola? Is there not an alternative strategy that would minimize our policy losses, both domestic and foreign (a calculus of domestic and foreign costs and benefits)?

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